As a national minority has global strategic emerging industries and the domestic market the influence of the industry, photovoltaic industry from the date of birth accompanied with industrial policy stimulus and financial support, at the same time in the rapid expansion of the scale, depth of policy increasingly dependent on the healthy development of the industry '- a policy of trouble, the industry will be volatile.After the "531 New Deal", the photovoltaic industry reacted strongly, and once again exposed the lack of core technology, too much reliance on policies and other deep-rooted problems in the industry.

Represent the volatility

Production has been cut orders to reduce prices decline

Layoffs, shutdowns, back pay..."531 New Deal" after the emergence of photovoltaic enterprises shock, causing concern and concern of the whole industry.

After the "531 new policy", many enterprises such as jiangsu zhenfa, nanjing CLP power co., LTD., changzhou gexin, hailun photovoltaic, jiangxi xuyang reddy and so on have exposed the employee salary claim incident one after another. Longji shares, poly gexin, LDK and other leading photovoltaic enterprises have stopped production or sold their subordinate power stations and subsidiaries.

According to a survey by the China photovoltaic industry association, the utilization rate of photovoltaic industry has dropped sharply. Many enterprises have stopped production or reduced production capacity due to the reduction of orders after the "531 new policy". Large, medium and small enterprises are not exempt.Chen jihua, vice President of jiangxi ruijing solar technology co., LTD., said: "after the '531 new policy', our sales in June fell rapidly from 120 million yuan to more than 50 million yuan, with a loss of more than 6 million yuan. Only four of the 15 production lines were opened."LDK, once the industry leader, also discontinued its silicon plant for maintenance, and only a small number of orders were placed for production in the battery factory.

Not only did orders fall sharply, but so did prices.< / p > < p > jingke energy President assistant guo yihuan introduced, "531 New Deal", the price of polycrystalline silicon material quickly fell from 110 to 120 yuan/kg to 80 yuan/kg, monocrystalline silicon material is about the same, some silicon material enterprises stop production.Fan lei of chairman of company of xu Yang reddy calculates cost zhang, "531 New Deal" hind, silicon piece price drops from 3.6 yuan/piece to 2.35 yuan/piece, and the silicon that the enterprise produces a silicon piece to need cost of material of silicon 1.3 yuan, blame silicon cost 1.1 yuan, every sell a silicon piece direct manufacturing cost loses 5 cents.Including management, financial and sales costs of about 0.25 yuan per piece and depreciation costs of 0.2 yuan per piece, the loss is even greater and only some production lines can be closed."In the past two years, we have basically maintained full production, producing 76 million silicon wafers a month.But production fell to 11m units in June, at a rate of less than 15 per cent.

The "531 New Deal" proposed temporarily not to arrange the construction scale of ordinary photovoltaic power station in 2018, and the scale of distributed photovoltaic project was 10GW.Statistics from China photovoltaic industry association show that in the first half of this year, domestic installed capacity of distributed photovoltaic was about 12GW.Jiang fuping, general manager of Shanghai chaori (jiujiang) solar energy co., LTD., said: "this means that the annual quota has been used up, and the policy for next year is not clear. The industry is at a loss as to where to go next."

The depth of the dependence

As soon as the wind blows, the industry will be caught in a storm

Since the new century, China's photovoltaic industry has developed rapidly from scratch and become an emerging industry with global market influence.But the reporter investigates discovery, such an industry that has international market competition ability wears multiple "straitjacket".

-- reliance on industrial policy is difficult to cure.Due to the high cost of photovoltaic power generation at the beginning of the launch of the domestic photovoltaic market in 2013, the state implemented the policy of electricity subsidy per kilowatt hour for the construction of photovoltaic power stations.Yuan wei, vice President of LDK, said the subsidy policy has spurred a renewed investment boom in the photovoltaic industry, which has attracted many people who didn't work in the sector in the past.According to statistics of China photovoltaic industry association, in 2017, China's production of polycrystalline silicon, silicon wafer, battery wafer and component respectively accounted for 55%, 87%, 69% and 71% of the world, and the cumulative installed capacity of photovoltaic was 130GW, ranking first in the world for three consecutive years.

At the beginning of the development of photovoltaic industry more than ten years ago, almost all provinces supported photovoltaic industry as a key emerging industry.However, the "531 New Deal" is equivalent to the subsidy policy "brake", the industry immediately into trouble.Yuan wei sighed: "the impact of the policy on the industry is too great!As soon as the policy changes, the industry is in a storm.

-- there is a high risk of trade friction.China's photovoltaic industry has been swinging between the domestic market and foreign markets.Around 2012, except for upstream silicon, China's photovoltaic industry took the lead in the world in terms of production scale. However, successive rounds of "double reverse" in Europe and the United States made the photovoltaic industry into the first industry-wide dilemma, and a large number of enterprises went bankrupt, which directly prompted China to launch the domestic photovoltaic application market."At that time, we were heavily dependent on foreign markets. On the one hand, we had competitive advantages in industrialization; on the other hand, we had vicious price competition after the industry expanded too fast.""Said wu dacheng, former deputy director of the photovoltaic professional committee of the Chinese renewable energy association.

After the "531 New Deal", many companies have set their sights on overseas markets, especially emerging markets such as India."' going global 'also faces many obstacles, and there may be a new round of disorderly competition," Chen said.So far this year, the United States has introduced section 201, which imposes safeguard tariffs on imports of solar cells and components, and in July India ruled to impose a two-year safeguard tax on imports of cells and components from China and Malaysia.

-- financing and lending may be tightened.China's photovoltaic industry also has an important lifeline -- financing and loan. Since 2012, the industry has experienced a great shock. The bankruptcy of some enterprises is related to the rupture of capital chain and the bank's tightening of loan.After the "531 New Deal", many enterprises are afraid of triggering a chain reaction of financial institutions to stop lending and pump out loans.

'the debt ratio of the photovoltaic industry is on the high side,' Mr. Fan said. 'once the market collapses, there will be problems in the capital chain.'"We currently have about 2.4 billion yuan in debt, which is small in the industry.But we have been in arrears since April and it is very likely that we will be treated as non-performing loans if we do not pay them by the end of September.

"The eldest must die"?

Leading enterprises fall from the "altar" industry "big but not strong"

Looking back at the development process of the photovoltaic industry, we can find that some leading domestic and even global photovoltaic giants have fallen down from the "altar" after experiencing a flash in the pan.Now, in the context of lower subsidies and tighter financing environment, these adverse factors have posed more severe challenges to the management ability and technological innovation of large enterprises.

There is a "boss must die" mantra circulating in the photovoltaic industry.Such as the world's largest photovoltaic components and former panel makers suntech is bankrupt reorganization, the world's largest LDK polysilicon wafer manufacturers has been sell this year, the world's largest photovoltaic component suppliers yingli has just been nyse securitiesrules, become the world's largest after yingli trina solar photovoltaic components suppliers have been delisted.

"It seems to be a curse of the industry. The boss is going to fall off in a few years, and he's going to fall off badly.Everybody is watching and waiting to see which big company falls first in this round of shock.Guo yihuan, who has worked at trina solar, said that in 2016, jinko became a global supplier of solar photovoltaic modules.

Leading enterprises are large in scale and strong in technology. They should have stronger market competitiveness and anti-risk ability. The curse of "the eldest brother must die" is hard to understand.'the leading photovoltaic enterprises have developed rapidly under the subsidy policy and relatively loose financing environment,' Mr. Guo said. 'the management is not necessarily up to speed, nor does it necessarily have core technology or strong innovation ability.'In the context of lower subsidies and tighter financing environment, leading enterprises face more severe challenges.

From the market reaction after the "531 New Deal", it can be seen that large enterprises have large investment and high debt and face more prominent problems than small enterprises.In the view of more insiders, the "death of the leader" of the photovoltaic industry is the epitome of the "big but not strong" photovoltaic industry in C